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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3 (2) (a) of 
the Utah Code 19 53 as amended. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment 
dismissing Plaintiff's claim that the Defendant, State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., was guilty of breach of 
contract and breach of implied covenants of bad faith, fair 
dealing, and fraud in the manner in which it dealt with 
Plaintiff's claims under Plaintiff's policy of insurance 
with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
International Rehabilitation Associates, Inc., was dismissed 
from the case by Judgment and Order dated April 4, 1989. (R. 
202-204). State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., was 
granted a Summary Judgment by Judge Michael Murphy on 
December 7, 1989 (R.351). Plaintiff appeals the decision 
for Summary Judgment and asks this Court to reverse the 
decision and remand the case back to the District Court for 
a trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal are the following: 
1. Whether there is a genuine issue of material 
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fact regarding Defendant/Respondent's breach of duty to 
Plaintiff/Appellant in the following particulars. 
(a) Whether the Plaintiff/Appellant, as a first 
party insured, has a breach of contract claim against the 
Defendant/Respondent. 
(b) Whether Plaintiff/Appellant has a cause of 
action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
(c) Whether there is a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding Plaintiff's/Appellant's claim of fraud. 
2. That there exists a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding Defendant's/Respondent's breach of duty to 
Plaintiff/Appellant and Summary Judgment should be reversed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff/Appellant, hereinafter referred to as 
"Pixton" was insured by Defendant/Respondent State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., hereinafter referred to as 
"State Farm" at the time she was involved in an accident, 
under Policy No. 477-6467-44. 
On March 12, 1984, Pixton was involved in an 
automobile accident when an unattended runaway vehicle, 
owned by Robert J. Davies struck the automobile which Pixton 
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was driving. Mr. Davies was also insured by State Farm. 
(R. 2-3) As a result of the accident Pixton sustained 
injuries and needed medical treatment. On or about July 5, 
1984, State Farm's agent, Felix Jensen, contracted 
International Rehabilitation Associates, hereinafter 
referred to as IRA to assist him in evaluating Pixton1s 
claim. (R.3-4) Pixton believed the nurse/employees of IRA 
were in fact hired to assist her in physical recovery and 
rehabilitation. (R.56) 
During this time of recovery Pixton was paid PIP 
benefits under her insurance policy. Pixton was tendered a 
settlement of $2,500.00 May 30, 1985 on the basis of Mr. 
Jensen's evaluation of her condition. 
(R. 5) After this offer, on November 14, 1986 
Pixton made a formal demand to State Farm to provide her 
with the amount of medical expenses incurred by State Farm, 
including the amount paid to I.R.A for medical and nursing 
services. The latter request was denied by State Farm. 
(R.71) State Farm claimed that monies paid to IRA were for 
non-testimonial experts and were file expenses, claiming 
them to be non-medical expenses. Pixton made more demands 
to State Farm by herself and through her attorney, which 
were refused. Pixton rejected State Farm's $2,500.00 offer to 
settle her claim. State Farm made no counter offers of 
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settlement prior to Pixton filing a complaint on March 4, 
1987 against State Farm and IRA. Previous to this time 
she was not going to retain an attorney or file a 
lawsuit.(R.56) On April 4, 1989 a Summary Judgment was 
entered for IRA dismissing them as a Defendant. 
Pixton, on May 12, 1989, amended the complaint in 
this case alleging breach of contract, breach of implied 
covenants of good faith, fair dealing and an action in 
fraud. As no progress was being made to settle this matter, 
Pixton was placed in a position of having to go forward and filed 
another lawsuit against Robert J. Davies and Carl Hothan, 
in Case No. (87-7987) for injuries sustained from the accident 
March 12, 1984. 
It was not until the day of trial, May 9, 1989, 
five years after the incident occurred, that State Farm 
extended an offer of $7,500.00 to Pixton to settle the case. 
Pixton did not feel this was fair, but due to State Farm's 
delay, and their refusal to give her any information as to 
money paid to IRA, she accepted the offer. Pixton, due to 
force of economic circumstances, personal problems and 
advice of counsel, felt compelled to accept the offer. The 
settlement was entered June 13, 1989. Settlement was based 
on admitted medicals of only $871.51. See District Court 
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file (87-7987). The claims against State Farm were not 
dismissed. 
State Farm filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in 
the instant case. The Court granted State Farm's Motion 
December 7, 1989 finding no conflict of interest between 
State Farm's adjuster, waiver of rights to IRA information, 
no breach of contract or implied covenants of good faith or 
fair dealing or fraud. (R.351) Pixton appeals that ruling. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Pixton contends the Motion for Summary Judgment 
should not have been granted in favor of State Farm. That 
there are genuine issues of material facts presented in the 
pleadings, affidavits, memorandums and arguments on file 
concerning her claims of breach of the insurance contract, 
breach of implied covenants to deal fairly and in good faith 
with her in settling her claim and fraud. 
State Farm did not deal fairly and in good faith 
by delaying settlement for 5 years when it had all information 
required to settle within the first year. State Farm withheld 
medical expenses information from Pixton, thus reducing her 
recovery. That the Trial Court did not take into account Pixton1s 
affidavit or the one of Mr. Milton Beck in making its decision. 
Pixton contends that the totality of State Farm's actions 
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and attitudes toward settlement perpetuated a fraud on her 
causing aggravation and mental distress. Pixton contends 
that a jury could find breach of contract and bad faith 
dealing by the insurer if issues were submitted to them. To 
allow the Summary Judgment to stand effectively denies 
Pixton a hearing on the merits, on the issue of fact as to 
whether State Farm acted in good faith in dealing with the 
insured-Pixton. There are abundant allegations in the 
record showing genuine issues of fact to reverse and remand 
this case for further hearings and a jury trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT INSURER BREACHED ITS CONTRACT AND IMPLIED 
COVENANT OF FAIR DEALING, AND GOOD FAITH TOWARDS 
THE INSURED UNDER ITS INSURANCE CONTRACT 
It is a well settled point of law that an 
insurance company has, besides its basic contractual duty, 
an obligation to deal in good faith and fairly with its 
insured. 
This implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair 
dealing is imposed in most jurisdictions. Crisici v. 
Security Insurance Co., 66 CAL 2d 425, 426 P2D 173 (1967); 
4 0ALR 2d 168 (1955) Corwin Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. 
Westchester Fire Co. 279 N.W. 2d 638 (1979) (N.D. 1979); 
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Timmons v. Royal Globe Insurance Co., 653 P2d 907 (Okla. 
1982) . 
A major decision that all insurance contracts, 
first party as wrell as third party, contain an implied duty 
of good faith and fair dealing was announced in Gruenberg v. 
Aetna Insurance Company, 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P2d 1032. The 
court stated: 
"The duty to act is imminent in the 
contract whether the company is attend-
ing to> the claims of third persons 
against the insured or the claims of the 
insured itself." 510 P2d at 1038. 
In Rawlings v. Apodacca 776 P2d 565, 569 (Arizona 
1986) held., "that the law implies a covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing in every contract." See Restatement 
(second edition) of Contracts §205 (1981); Williston on 
contract §670 at P159. 
In regards to this duty the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated: 
"with respect to making and accepting 
proposals of settlement to protect its 
insured, we believe the best view is that 
it must act in good faith and be zealous 
in protecting the interest of its insured 
as it will in looking after its own" emphasis 
added Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P2d 576 (1967) 
More recently the Utah Supreme Court held 
"... that the good faith duty to bargain 
or settle under an insurance contract 
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is only one aspect of the good faith and 
fair dealing implied in all contracts and a 
violation of that duty gives rise to a 
claim for breach of contract. In addition 
. . . . held that the refusal to bargain and 
settle, standing alone, may, under 
appropriate circumstances be sufficient 
to prove a breach." Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 701 P2d 795 (1985). 
The Court further stated in Beck v. Farmers 
supra, 
... we conclude that the implied obligation 
of good faith performance contemplates, at 
the very least, that the insurer will 
diligently investigate the facts... 
will fairly evaluate the claim, and 
will thereafter act promptly and 
reasonably in rejecting or settling 
the claim. See Anderson v. Continental 
Insurance Co., 85 Wise 2d at 692-93 271 N.W. 
2d at 377; Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance 
24 Cal 3D 809, 818-819, 598 P2d 452, 
456-457 (1979) The duty of good faith 
also requires the insurer to "deal with 
laymen as laymen and not as experts in 
the subtleties of the law and under 
writing" and to refrain from actions 
that well injured the insured's ability 
to obtain the contract. MFA Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Flint, 574 S.W. 2d at 720, 
quoting Merchants Indemnity Corp. v. 
Eggeleston 37 N.J. 144, 122, 179 A.2d 
505, 509 (1962); accord Bowler v. Fidelity 
& Casualty Co., 53 N.J. 313, 327, 250 A2d 
580, 587 (1969) 
The Supreme Court amplified the principal that 
insurer has breached its duty it is liable for 
suffered by that breach. 
It is Pixton's contention that State Farm breached 
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its duties to her, by not settling promptly and fairly and 
not giving her the information needed to gain a fair 
settlement from State Farm. That State Farm, did not deal 
with Pixton as a "layman" but expected her to act as an 
expert in the subtleties of law and underwriting. This was 
accomplished by State Farm's classifying the amounts paid 
IRA as expenses and not medicals. Pixton clearly thought 
she was receiving medical benefits from IRA (R 56 and at 
287) . 
The basic reason for allowing an action for bad 
faith and unfair dealing is due to the imbalance of 
bargaining power between the insurer and insured. The 
insured needs some leverage to take away the advantage the 
insurer has and give him an effective remedy against the 
insurer that acts in bad faith. Beck v. Farmers Exchange 
supra. 
Pixton has been harmed by the actions of State 
Farm and she believes that if the question were presented 
to a jury it could and would find that State Farm acted in 
bad faith in that they violated a fiduciary relationship 
they had established with Pixton through its employees and 
its position of economic strength and power. See Dependable 
Life Insurance Co. v. Harris, 510 502d 985 (Fla. Dist. Ct.). 
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Now, the fact established by the many cases that 
a duty exists the question is did State Farm as the insurer 
breach its duty and obligation to Pixton? This question 
Pixton contends gives rise to a question that a jury must 
decide. 
The facts point to State Farm's breach of duty in 
several areas. State Farm, knowing that there was complete 
liability for which they had to pay, shortly after the 
accident did not effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable 
settlement. 
The first thing State Farm did was to have its 
agent, Felix Jensen, bring in the IRA nurses and employees, 
not as an organization to help Pixton recover and 
rehabilitate her, but to find a means to keep their monetary 
liability down. This was not a responsible action to Pixton 
but a means of cutting their (insurers) losses. Pixton 
believed IRA employees were there to help her in recovery 
and rehabilitation not to be working for the insurance 
company to mitigate their loss. (R 56 & 287). 
When State Farm made an offer it was only for 
$2,500.00. (R 5) At the time of the offer the claims 
supervisor for State Farm, Samatha Bird, recognized that the 
claim of Pixton was worth $7,500.00. (R 236-238) State 
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Farm proffered the $7,500.00 amount on May 9, 1989, the day 
of the trial 5 years later. (See Civil Case 87-7987). This 
was not a prompt and fair handling of the claim by State 
Farm and a jury could so find. 
Further, by insurance terminology medical expenses 
in this case became file expenses. Thus, the refusal of 
State Farm to release these expenses paid to IRA, until the 
date of trial in Civil Case No. 877987, left Pixton in a 
position of not being fully knowledgeable of the full amount 
she could recover under standard insurance settlement 
practices. State Farm was not dealing fairly or in good 
faith with Pixton, they were protecting their own pocket 
book. This action decimated Pixton causing her great 
aggravation and emotional distress. These are damages that 
Pixton should be allowed to recover and a trial should be 
held on the issue. See Hayseeds Inc. v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty 352 SE2d 73 (W.Va 1986) Crisici v. Security 
Insurance Co. 426 P2d 178: It has been held breach of 
contract includes mental and emotional distress. See 
Gruenberg v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. 9 Cal 3d 566 510 P2d 
1032 (1973). Beck v. Farmer, supra. 
Pixton also contends that a jury could find bad 
faith and unfair dealing, in that the adjuster for State 
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Farm, Felix Jensen, was the adjuster on both the first party 
claim and the third party claim of Pixton. This can only be 
an open conflict of interest hindering Pixton's ultimate 
chance of a fair settlement. It is Pixton's contention that 
Mr. Jensen had access to both files which contained 
information about Pixton's claim. A position which put 
Pixton at a disadvantage when it came time for settlement. 
A prudent and fair approach would have been for State Farm 
to have two separate adjusters in this matter as the insured 
must have protection and all negotiations must be above 
board. 
The record contains an affidavit of Milton Q. 
Beck, licensed public insurance adjuster of 15 years 
experience, qualified to testify as an expert witness in 
insurance bad faith cases. Mr. Beck examined all the 
documents available and in his expert opinion stated there 
is "substantial evidence of insurer's (State Farm) failure 
to satisfy its legal duties of good faith and fair dealing 
in the adjustment of insured's (Pixton) loss. 
Mr. Beck's opinion was also that State Farm 
breached its duties by failing to have two insurance 
adjusters to handle the separate claims and failing to 
disclose the amount of expenses paid to IRA by State Farm. 
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That State Farm's non-disclosure of IRA payment caused 
Pixton to receive less for her claim. If known the 
reasonable sett ament wou . be between $9,000.00 to 
$11,000.00 using the standard for settling claims of this 
kind. (R90-93) It was his opinion that these actions 
constituted bad faith. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Beck, Supra accepted 
Beck's argument that the affidavits as submitted by Beck and 
the Plaintiff were sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
fact as to whether Defendant, Farmer's breached the implied 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing. In American 
Concept Insurance Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P2d 271 (Utah Ct App 
1988) in a bad faith case, this court held an expert may 
state his opinion on the ultimate issues when it is based on 
the type of information usually relied on by experts in his 
field and allowed the affidavit of an expert to be used. 
Pixton asks this court to follow the principal set 
forth by the Supreme Court and rule that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact to be decided by a jury. 
POINT II 
THAT THERE EXISTS A GENUINE ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACTS 
BREACH OF DUTY 
SUMMARY 
REGARDING 
TO 
JUDGMENT 
STATE 
THE INSURED 
SHOULD 
FARM'S 
THUS 
BE REVERSED 
The Trial Court in granting State Farm's Motion 
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for Summary Judgment believed there was no genuine issue of 
facts that would warrant a trial in this matter (R. 351). 
Judge Murphy ruled that he felt there was no conflict of 
interest on Mr. Felix Jensen's part, being adjuster for both 
Davies and Pixton; there was a waiver concerning the issue 
whether or not the payments to IRA were medical expenses or 
file expenses; the Beck affidavit was not material. 
(Reporters transcript Nov. 20, 1989 P.33-34). 
Summary Judgment is appropriate if pleadings and 
all other submissions, including depositions, answers... and 
affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Hegler Ranch Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P2d 1390 
(Utah 1980) The record and submissions are to be viewed in 
a light favorable to the party opposing the motion. This is 
the standard applied and universally followed. Jensen v. 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 611 P2d 363 (Utah 1980) 
Behlmager v. Carson, 603 P2d 790 (Utah 1979). 
Pixton claims the court erred in its rulings and a 
trial should examine the issues. The Judge's ruling in this 
case, that Beck's affidavit was not admissible because the 
issues presented are different from those in Beck v. 
Farmer's Exchange, is erroneous. The issue simply is that 
of bad faith by the insurer. 
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The sworn affidavits in this case for Pixton, 
especially that of Beck shows that there are material and 
serious issues that should be tried. 
As stated in Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P2d 
191, 193 (1975), "it only takes one sworn statement under 
oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the 
controversy and create an issue of fact.11 In the instant 
case there are sworn affidavits by Pixton and Mr. Beck, an 
expert, refuting State Farm's claim they were not guilty of 
bad faith in this matter. How could the District Court 
Judge refute or deny Beck's affidavit in this case when he 
had not read it and State Farm had not moved to strike it or 
filed a rebutting affidavit? (Reporter's Transcript Nov. 
20, 1989 P. 11 and 12. 
Based on the American Concept Ins. Co, v. 
Lochhead, case supra, Beck's affidavit would be sufficient 
to oppose granting of a Summary Judgment. His affidavit is 
sufficient in that it sets forth facts that would be 
admissible in evidence. See Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 
260, 436 P2d 1021 (1968) Norton v. Blackham, 669 P2d 857; 
Rainford v. Rytting 22 Utah 2d 252, 451, P2d 769. The 
affidavit also meets any further sufficiency requirement as 
it was made on personal knowledge of Mr. Beck who is 
competent to testify on the issues at trial. 
Pixton also asserts that the Trial Court erred 
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when ruling that she waived any right to access and usage of 
the information concerning payments to IRA by State Farm. 
While it is true that Summary Judgment may be granted based 
on an affirmative defense, such as a valid release (waiver) 
that would defeat the cause of action, Ulibarri v. 
Christensen, 2 Utah 2nd 367, 275 P2d 170; in the instant 
case this is not the fact. State Farm did not plead waiver 
or release as an affirmative defense, thus based on 
procedural precepts the Summary Judgment as granted on that 
ground should be reversed. This is especially true, in 
that, Pixton did move to have a decision on whether the IRA 
payments by State Farm were to be classified a medical 
expense or not (Reporters Transcript pg 9) and Judge 
Frederick in Case No. 877987 refused to rule on the 
motion. 
Because a Summary Judgment is granted as a matter 
of law rather than ruling on the facts this court is 
allowed, as an appellate court, to reappraise the trial 
courts legal conclusions. See Barber v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 751 P2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) Pixton thus asks 
this Court to look at the facts and the record and 
reevaluate them. Upon such reappraisal of the facts the 
court should reverse the Summary Judgment. The court will 
become aware of the presence of many disputes as to material 
facts which will disallow the granting of a Summary 
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Judgment. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P2d 238 
(Utah 1974) . 
Pixton believes that reasonable minds could differ 
as to the conduct of State Farm in handling her claim and 
whether their conduct of not dealing with her in good faith 
constituted bad faith and did not measure up to the required 
standard in the insurance business. See Jackson v. Dabney, 
645 P2d 613 (Utah 1982). Further, that she needed to only 
show contraverting facts to have the case sent to trial. 
This Pixton did and the Summary Judgment should be reversed. 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors Inc., 761 P2d 4 2 
Ct 1988 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P2d 
342 (Utah 1978). 
Because Summary Judgment is such a harsh remedy 
and prevents litigants from fully presenting their case the 
courts have held that the granting of such remedy should be 
done reluctantly and only when there is no clear issues to 
be resolved at trial. In Re Williams Estate, 348 P2d 348; 
Brandt v. Sprinqville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350; 353 P2d 
460 (1960). 
Pixton asks this court to follow the true and 
correct theory in this case that she is entitled to have all 
the facts presented, inferences fairly arising therefrom be 
considered in a light most favorable to her and be resolved 
in her favor, as the party opposing the motion. See Young 
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v. Texas Co., 8 Utah 2d 206 331 P2d 1099 (1958) Thompson v. 
Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P2d 62 (1964) English v. 
Kienke 774 P2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App 1989) Bowen v. Riverton 
City 65 P2d 434 (Utah 1982), Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson 
Brick Co., 780 P2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the 
Summary Judgment granted to State Farm, should be reversed 
and the case be remanded for trial on the clearly disputed 
issue of fact and merits. 
CONCLUSION 
That based on the law and facts presented, the 
ruling granting Summary Judgment should be reversed and the 
matter remanded to the trial court with instructions to have 
the matter tried on its merits, consequential damages, 
attorney's fees, costs and whatever further relief deemed 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
Respectfully submitted this // day of 
O^V^ , 1990 
MA^T'BILJANIC / / 
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